The secret service was forced to announce in connection with two documents "planted" on the Internet during the last four months that they were papers hastily compiled from internal sources of information containing elements of truth. In the first letter, made public by our magazine, the author, who called himself by the name of anonymous, reached the audacious final conclusion that at the time of UD Zrt's undoing the National Security Office (NBH) was not serving Hungarian interests, since the private security firm had worked as Mol's internal security service during the period when Austrian-Russian attempts at infiltration were made.  Without the UD the Hungarian oil company was therefore much more exposed to external attack. (Heti Válasz, 21 May 2009).

National insecurity

Sándor Laborc, who eventually failed in the surveillance operation, was recently given a farewell present by his benefactors: three days before his resignation on 29 August, a summary of the gypsy murders was put on the internet, claiming that Laborc was siding with the same extremists who had jeopardised Hungary's international reputation (among other things).

The collapse of the secret service's organisational structure is not only seen at a deeper level, but on the surface too. On the one hand, at the beginning of August Ádám Ficsor, the minister without portfolio responsible for civil national security, publicly declared that he would be leaving office on 14 September because of his participation in MSZP's campaign. Disorder is further increased by the fact that he was entrusted with three of the five Hungarian services, i.e. for a temporary period he will hold sway over them as the Director-General. (see tables). The government presumably insisted upon this provision so that both Sándor Laborc's replacement, László Balajti, and the new head of the National Security Special Service, Imre Mogyoró, could be saved from being questioned by an expert committee (since the law only obliges "fully-fledged", established leaders to appear before this parliamentary body.)

Although the Military Security Office (KBH) represented permanence itself, it too has now entered a period of impermanence since the death of Géza Stefan, who had been its director-general from 1994. The task left to Ferenc Kovácsics, who was similarly accorded a procuratorial status, was to explain what kind of relationship KBH had formally had with prominent figures of the radical right. What was certain in regard to this was that the organisation under Stefán employed István Cs., referred to as the Benjamin of the gypsy killings, as a secret liaison. As we reported earlier, István Dósa, the retired soldier and dissident leader of the Hungarian Guard, who has distanced himself from the extreme right-wing Jobbik, has also connected himself with KBH. Although according to the confession of the chief-of-police, one of whose forefathers was a major-general of the militia, he resisted attempts to be recruited by the secret service, the Jobbik legends still explain Dósa's further radicalisation by his having been blackmailed by the secret service (Heti Válasz, 7 May 2009).

Is the charge false?

The fact that Sándor Laborc had to resign from the leadership of NBH reveals more about the secret services' loss of prestige than the crumbs of information that have seeped out so far. After the Public Prosecutor's Office named György Szilvásy as a suspect accused of the circulation of particular personal data he had extracted from recorded telephone conversations, we can claim with near certainty that the former director-general, who worked together with the former competent minister, cannot escape suspicion. (The general's interrogation may be delayed for various reasons, foremost among which is that he happens to come under the competent scope of authority not of the Central Investigation Chief Prosecutor's Office but the military prosecutor's office skilled in cases involving official members of the national security services.)

Since Laborc would have in any case been suspended from his position because of the contingent suspicion surrounding him, his resignation - from his own standpoint - was virtually necessary. This was especially the case since on 3 July the National Investigating Office (NNI) halted the procedures pertaining to the UD Zrt. security firm (lacking a criminal act), which had actually been the subject of the director-general's charge submitted on 10 September 2008. The general also made the mistake of turning to the police in his own name (and not on behalf of the NBH) and, moreover, instead of lodging his complaint against unknown perpetrators, he named four of UD's staff. This opened the way for the company, nicknamed Fidesz's shadow octopus, to lodge a "counter-complaint" against Laborc for making a false accusation.

The director-general pretty much made another wrong move when informing on UD Zrt.'s chiefs in relation to a case of abuse of ammunition and in so doing "forced" the police to conduct house searches of the people involved and to seize their data on 11 September. However, the NBH could have found out earlier from tapped telephone conversations that József Horváth and company acquired the weapons exclusively for showcase purposes - which means that Sándor Laborc also became vulnerable to prosecution for misleading the authorities. (The former secret service leaders can console themselves that - independently of the charge instigated by NBH's chief - the Agency for Development and Logistics of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence gave a one-off expert opinion to the police based upon which UD Zrt.'s official János Tóth could eventually be charged with abusing military products. This means that the National Bureau of Investigation, subordinate to the government, was given ammunition thanks to a one-off expert from another government organ. Tensions are somewhat increased by the fact that although the Ministry of Defence report is dated 22 December 2008, the police only used the opportunity to file an official suspicion on 9 September 2009.)

Odd careers

The UD blunder will, however, only be classed as a low point in Laborc's life-work if there are criminal repercussions from the notes pertaining to the series of gypsy murders. The document patched together from actual NBH information by implication states that the office simply did not "make a move" following the first or second attack against gypsies, i.e. it did not resume surveillance or phone tapping of Hungarian extremists who had come to its attention. As our experts have put it: "this should be the minimum for an organisation whose yearbooks contain a chapter especially devoted to the activities of radicals."

According to the document put on the internet, the suspected murderers - with the exception of István Cs. - were all monitored by the Hajdú-Bihar County Branch Office of NBH, especially after they planned to acquire firearms, although in the "company's" centre in Budapest, permission was withheld to continue the close surveillance of István K., Árpád K. and Zsolt P. The records state that Sándor Laborc only requested information from the Hajdú-Bihar county NBH branch office after the suspects were taken into custody in August, although the reports on István K. were sent to Budapest as early as spring with a recommendation that the director-general be warned about the events. (The Debrecen secret service staff had "thorough knowledge" of the man born in Mezőtúr, which even included what football team he supported and who backed him financially.)

One conclusion of substance is taking shape from all of this: the NBH did not work together with the police in the appropriate way. If the NNI investigators had known more about the perpetrators, it would have been enough to swoop on them in the hours before the following murder - i.e. the police could have waited until the culprits themselves gathered together the physical evidence. Not to mention that a delayed arrest would have provided the chance for some data to come to light on the possible accomplices and sponsors of the murderers.

Such antecedents to the events give rise to the question: is it the curse of professional inexperience or willful harm that the secret service suffers from? Our sources of information did not want to draw any wild conclusions from the fact that Sándor Laborc studied at the KGB academy in Moscow. At the same time, many people have seen that "irrational career paths have been followed in the sphere of national security recently, which indicates that nothing was of greater relevance in appointing people for positions than their intimate relationship with high politics". In the 90s Laborc worked for one of the Information Office's cover enterprises, Gibrill Commercial Ltd., and - after his official retirement - he went to work for the Tax Crime Control Directorate of APEH during the Fidesz era. He was reactivated in 2003-2004 and returned to NBH; the director-general, Lajos Galambos, virtually found out from reading the papers that a barely-known Laborc would be his operational deputy and from 2007 his successor.

Zsolt Hetesy, the chief of the Information Office, also burst into the world of the secret service like an exploding comet. During the period of the Horn government the specialist invigorated the cabinet of the minister for national security, István Nikolits, while during the Orbán period he kept out of the way at the UN representation in New York, working for the ministry of foreign affairs. In 2002 he was immediately promoted to director-general of the National Security Special Service, and from there parachuted into his present position. Hetesy was replaced by the selfsame László Balajti in the special service who - although never having carried out any operational work - replaced Laborc in 2009 to run the NBH, an organisation he was utterly unfamiliar with.

All we have found out about Balajti from socialist circles is that all his life he worked for the special service, i.e. where the brother of parliamentary vice-president László Mandur was once one of the top leaders. Nevertheless, presumably, all that the government wants Balajti to do now is to finally put the brakes on the NBH, which went into overdrive in the Szilvásy-Laborc era.

WILL THE PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY of IBOLYA DÁVID AND KÁROLY HERÉNYI BE SUSPENDED?

The immunity committee will discuss the case of MDF president, Ibolya Dávid, and former faction leader, Károly Herényi, on 15 September, after which parliament can decide on whether or not to suspend the two MPs' parliamentary immunity - confirmed József Alajos Géczi, the body's president. The Prosecutor General demanded the suspension of the immunity of the two MPs in June, but the committee's socialist chairman did not convene an extraordinary sitting at the time. The result of the parliamentary vote cannot be predicted for the time being; what we know is that in public prosecution cases the expert committee always recommends that the right of immunity be suspended, since - as can be read in the committee's statements - "this serves to protect parliament's authority."

The public prosecutor's office would like to name the two leaders of MDF as suspects for two counts of abusing personal data and one count of criminal duress, since they are believed to have wanted to use the recording in their possession - in which Sándor Csányi, chairman and CEO of OTP and János Tóth of UD Zrt. are conversing, - to force Kornél Almássy, a potential candidate for the position of party president, to resign.

Ibolya Dávid had earlier objected that while an investigation had been launched on the basis of Tóth's denouncement, her own petition had been rejected by the public prosecution with "conspicuous haste". (According to the president of MDF, UD Zrt. was commissioned to begin to secretly compile data against her, at the same time the company insists that it did not carry out any illegal activity. However, the public prosecutor's office has established that the data compilation in regard to Dávid remained in the preparatory stage, thus Csányi and company did not commit a crime.)

According to Barnabás Futó, the legal representative of UD Zrt.'s owners, if Ibolya Dávid had really not concurred with the public prosecutor's rejection of her petition, she could have resorted to a substitute private prosecution. The lawyer added that the politician would then have had to name Sándor Csányi or János Tóth as perpetrators - which she obviously did not do because she did not want to also be connected to a case of false accusation.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF ORGANISATIONS

GOVERNMENT

Minister without portfolio for the civilian secret services

Ádám Ficsor
(16 April 2009 - 14 September 2009)
György Szilvásy
(1 July 2007 - 15 April 2009)

National Security Office

(Guards against the activities of foreign secret services potentially damaging to the country's sovereignty, political, economic and defence interests; uncovers criminal acts committed against the state and acts aimed at disturbing constitutional order.)

Director-Generals:
László Balajti
(acting director-general 1 September 2009 - )
Sándor Laborc
1 June 2007 - 31 August 2009)
Lajos Galambos
(27 July 2004 - 31 May 2007)

National Security Special Service

(Secretly compiles information to assist organisations authorised by the state.)

Director-Generals:
Imre Mogyoró
(acting director-general, 1 September 2009 - )
László Balajti
1 December 2007 - 31 August 2009)
Zsolt Hetesy
5 August 2002 - 30 November 2007)

Information Office

(Procures, analyses and forwards information pertaining to overseas, to be used in the interests of national security necessary for government decisions.)

Director-General:
Zsolt Hetesy
1 December 2007 - )

Minister of Defence
Imre Szekeres
(9 June 2006 - )

Military Security Office

(Guards against the activities of foreign secret services aimed at harming the ministry of defence and the Hungarian Army; compiles information on organised crime posing a threat to the Hungarian Army.)

Director-Generals:
Ferenc Kovácsics
(acting director-general, 22 June 2009 - )
Géza Stefán
(1 August 1994 - 21 June 2009) (deceased)

Military Intelligence Office

(Uncovers intentions to attack the Republic of Hungary and activities that harm the sovereignty of the country.)

Director-General:
Károly Madarász
(1 January 2007 - )