"The Grand Cross of the Order of Merit was awarded to the men of the old and the new regime. In 1989, at the Opposition Roundtable talks, one of them was among those who were changing the system, and the other was relieved of his post. Now, twenty years later, Péter Tölgyessy and Miklós Németh congratulate one another. Isn't this a bit morbid?"

"I hardly think it would be better if we shook our fists at each another. This is a typical Hungarian story, with the whole of our post-1956 history in it. The difference between our memories of state socialism and those of other peoples living in this region is enormous. In the 1970's and 1980's, people here in Hungary felt we were way ahead of everyone else. They looked down on the other socialist countries. At times, even those Hungarians who lived elsewhere as immigrants were proud of János Kádár's country, with it's more humane conditions."

"Nowhere else did a political leader of the regime preceding the transition receive an award. For not only was Miklós Németh the prime minister, he was also a member of the Political Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party."

"Our transition was very different from that of the other countries. The change between the old and the new order was less significant here than anywhere else. In 1989, public opinion and the forces of the opposition all wanted a peaceful, negotiable transition. The last leaders of the single-party state seemed to be decisively different from the earlier leaders, but they didn't really have to hold their ground in real situations of democratic competition. The myth of the Németh-cabinet's expertise was for a long time regarded by all parliamentary governments as the standard. The opposition, on the other hand, did not have heroes celebrated by the public. The popularity of the opposition - constantly appearing on discussion panels - was nowhere near that of the single-party state's last leaders."

"Was it already evident by then that Socialism was over?"

"Around 1988-89, we were closer to the Polish state of emergency than we are now to Viktor Orbán's government. During the era of socialism, several promising people's movements had started in various places, but they had all ended in brutal retaliation. No one thought that in two or three years, the Soviet Union would no longer exist. All the Western leaders who visited the region suggested that we should proceed more cautiously, for they feared that Gorbachev's détente might suddenly end."

"In the end, it was not détente that broke down, but rather trust in the single-party state that melted away by the spring of 1990."

"When the Berlin Wall came down, the political climate suddenly changed. It became clear all of a sudden that like a chain reaction, the single-party state was over. Right away, our parties started competing to see whose anti-communism was greater. However, the Hungarians were still not participating in the events. When in 1989, the Polish Solidarity union (Solidarność) had three-four million members, here in Hungary, the opposition had a few tens of thousands. In the German Democratic Republic and in Prague, there were mass movements involving 100 thousand, even a million people, despite brutal police action. In contrast, here at home, only those events that were officially authorized drew larger crowds. Perhaps it's an exaggeration on my part, but people were more enthusiatic about going shopping to Vienna. The majority felt quite ambivalent about the whole change of system, and already in 1989, they had an aversion to the new debating parties. The object of their desire was not democracy, but rather the consumer patterns of the West. And if the price of that was parliamentarism, then they would just have to bear it somehow - that was how many people reacted to this issue."

"You, among others, created the legal framework of democratic transition, that is why you were awarded with the Grand Cross. And although you said you needed some time to think, you accepted it in the end, while in the past few years, there have been people who have turned down the awards."

"Only a few people have actually refused to accept an award. The normal thing would be if the person receiving the award could feel the recognition of the whole republic, the whole Hungarian nation. In our country, however, for quite some time now, it has been the two large political camps that have awarded their own outstanding people. Still, I think it's sad when someone wants to prove the strength of his personality by forcefully refusing acknowledgement awarded by the President of the Hungarian Republic. That is why I thought it wiser to behave as if we lived in a normal country. Another reason why it wasn't easy for me to accept the Grand Cross was because more and more people believe that the major cause of our troubles today is the change of system in Hungary."

"The question of where we went wrong arose right after the change of system, didn't it?"

"It's true, the question arose in the summer of 1990, and the change of system soon became an extremely unpopular expression. People's trust in the players who were responsible for the transition decreased drastically, and after 1991, support for the legal successor of the one-time single-party state grew higher and higher. Social differences suddenly increased, even though there was hardly any real performance justifying this. Hungarians - who during the Kádár years had been so satisfied - felt in 1991-92 that Hungary was one of Europe's most unjust countries, in which only crooks and foreigners prospered."

"Many people would agree with that today, and things are even worse now, owing to the economic crisis."

"At the moment, there are three different crises in Hungary. Only one of them has something to do with the world economy. And I'm not at all convinced that it will end very soon. But the numerous ills of the social model inherited from the Kádár-era are a lot more dangerous. Many aspects of this crisis - for example the black economy, entrepreneurial behaviour that wishes to gain advantages from public power instead of being competitive, or the striking moral problems - have become an innate part of our lives, just like Gyula Illyés wrote in his poem A sentence about tyranny (Egy mondat a zsarnokságról). On top of all this, the problems of politics and the cold civil war torture us. So all in all, our difficulties are probably a lot more serious now than they were at the time of the change of system, and at the same time, the hope of political actions making any sense at all is a lot thinner than it was back then."

"Of all these problems that you have mentioned, isn't it the moral crisis that is most difficult to recover from?"

"It's evident that it's most difficult for us to improve in a spiritual and moral respect. Until the logic of two camps at war weakens, while neither side accepts the permanent existence of the other, nothing will change for the better. In war, there is hardly room for public morality. Voters are usually more forgiving regarding the transgressions committed by people in their own camp. Typically, they are only shocked by the blunders and sins of those on the other side."

"And the pattern is passed down to our children."

"The strongest criticism of the change of system and the two decades following it is that today's youth does not feel it has anything to do with all that. In a healthy society, young people organically blend into the world that they inherited from their parents. They rebel against it, but they do not reject it completely. In 1989, the youth of that period refused the order that their parents lived in. Two decades later, the same thing is happening."

"At the time of the change of system, we still believed that politicians really wanted to do something. Since then, most of them have got stuck in the armchairs that they sat down in twenty years ago."

"Hungarians like to blame politicians - in general - for all their problems. And yet they are not willing to give these politicians a decent, legal salary, and especially not moral recognition. That is why anyone who wants to remain decent won't take on a public role nowadays. Consequently, things are primarily managed by the representatives of 1989. Many of them have grown old, others have suffered failures and lost their strength or their faith. The new players, on the other hand, come because of their personal careers, for the money, or, if they made a lot of money earlier, then quite often it's some kind of uncontrollable exhibitionism that drives them."

"Can this political elite be credible at all in the eyes of the voters?"

"One of the main problems of our country is the limited suitability and aptitude of its elite. Some five to ten thousand people determine a whole country's public life, its economy, culture and press, but very few of them are motivated in finding the common good, in a broader sense."

"You were once the chairman of the Free Democrats, later, you were a Fidesz MP, then you quit. Was it because you were disappointed in politics that you didn't speak in Parliament for 13 years?"

"I wasn't at all disappointed in politics, generally speaking. But already in the early autumn of 1990, on the evening of the local government elections - when the Free Democrats were most successful - I became a bench warmer of the republic. I did not wish to speak in the interest of politics that I believed to be faulty, but for years, I thought the time for sensible action might eventually come. I was mistaken, and looking back, I now think I should have given up active politics in the autumn of 1990."

"After receiving the award, you said you felt partly responsible for the situation the country had got into since the change of system. Where do you think your responsibility lies?"

"Although it was not what I wanted, the gap between the old and the new order was a lot smaller than it should have been, then almost immediately came the turmoil of the cold civil war, dragging us deep down. And yet I think that despite all its faults, the changes of 1989 gave the country a chance. Especially during the past ten years, Hungarian public life hasn't profited from this opportunity, instead, it has dragged our homeland down with all its might."

"How much do you think new elections and a new government can help?"

"Elections are always a source of hope. However, the problems are so severe, the means at our disposal so few, and Fidesz is carrying so many of its old, unsolved problems along, that the chance of yet another disappointment is there. Perhaps it would be wiser to start reducing citizens' expectations. Eighteen months from now, at the latest, the numerous crises will all be the new government's responsibility. And if the victorious right spends its time crushing its fallen political rival instead of easing social problems, it may well lose a lot of its popular support. The deepest fault in the Hungarian political divide cannot be eliminated by political means. Voters belonging to families who experienced the decades of state socialism as a time when they rose in social status will hardly convert en masse to to the right as a form of repentance."

"In other words, the Socialist Party owes its existence to the Kádár-era?"

"MSZP is without doubt a successor party, which is quite unique in this region. And it is in deep trouble at the moment, for which it has itself to blame. Nevertheless, I do not think that Hungarian politics will remain without the left for decades. If they victimize it, that will only serve to help it rise to its feet again. But it must also go through a significant change. Among the youngest voters, Jobbik has overtaken the Socialists - who for them symbolize the present order - and gained twice as many votes."

"What do the voters see in Jobbik, what appeal does it have that the other parties don't?"

"The appeal of Jobbik to the under-thirties is in fact a very strong criticism of their elders. The strength of Jobbik is their extra credibility. They were not a part of the past twenty years' chronicle of failures. In north-western Hungary, for example, they are now more popular among those who formerly voted for the Socialists, but their next victim may well be Fidesz, soon to become the governing power."

"So you're saying the party structure will change?"

"The situation the left is now in calls for new solutions. Yet the fall of its rival could easily jeopardize the justification of Fidesz's old politics. At the same time, the subjective conditions for the foundation of a new party do not exist. It seems that Hungarian society is incapable of building a new, more credible political elite."

"Can we consider Fidesz as the victor in this critical situation?"

"The chance of Viktor Orbán being able to plan long-term is smaller now than it was in 1998. The problems are a lot more serious. Real wages have fallen so drastically that citizens' incomes probably won't reach their former level of spring 2006 by the end of the cycle."

"Does it really only depend on this?"

"Not at all. One of the main reasons for the failure of left-wing governments is that they believe 'man shallt live by bread alone'. That is why they constantly place the distribution issue in the centre of their politics, but by doing so, they continually run into budgetary over-runs. Expectations are so high here in Hungary that it is impossible to satisfy Hungarians with economic results alone. The new rule can only be successful if it is able to break out of Kádár's distributory logic, and without constantly offending the multicoloured set of values of Hungarians, offer the country hope once more."