To start with one of the most sensitive issues, i.e. Hungarian-Russian relations, several articles have been published on the apropos of the Hungarian prime minister's visit to Moscow, about which the only word that springs to mind is "interesting".  This is because this otherwise neutral comment is mainly used in British diplomacy when there is no acceptable word available to describe the impression that what one has just heard is somehow not quite true.    

The former prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, also wrote about the Hungarian-Russian visit on his blog. Because of the asymmetrical nature of Russian-Hungarian relations he believes in connecting issues and handling them in ‘packages', he writes, as a beneficial long-term agreement on gas provision, for example, can only be signed with Moscow if Hungary takes a comprehensive approach. In connection with this, Gyurcsány harshly criticises - and supports his criticism with his personal experience - the Americans' sharp u-turn after their initially anti-Russian foreign policy, which is indicated, among other things, by their support for South Stream.

It is worth making a distinction between the usual political backbiting and professional arguments and closely study the latter, since this could be instrumental in finding a solution to the problems of the present.

Let us start by giving the "package" approach proposed by Hungary's former prime minister some consideration. Unfortunately, the first condition in package agreements is that the items offered and requested should roughly have the same importance for the two parties. However, largely due to the policy of the two former socialist governments, Hungary is at the mercy of Russia to such an extent that no agreement of this sort is feasible.

One of the basic tenets of foreign policy strategy theory is that in an asymmetrical relationship it is the separation of issues that                   is in the interests of the inferior party, since if the issues are connected, it is either more favourable to the superior party or leads to no agreement at all. In the case of the "packaged items" the inferior party must typically reckon with increased costs, since individual items are not accounted for at their own prices but as if they were mere tools to achieve the ultimate agreement.

Concrete examples prove that the extension costs of a nuclear power station significantly decrease, by up to a third, if carried out in the framework of an international tender, whereas if the same project is included in a package as collateral, the same cost reductions are highly unlikely to happen. Thus, it is not surprising that it is usually the Russian party that proposes package negotiations. For Hungary to suggest an all-inclusive, comprehensive package agreement under the present circumstances is...."interesting".

As regards the former prime minister's proposed agreement for "at least thirty years" of gas transportation agreement to be resigned with Moscow, based on the still valid contract, the Russian party will benefit from the current price formula until 2015. And unless an infrastructure development project enabling Hungary to access an external gas source is launched soon, and the dependent Hungarian gas supply structure changes before the next renegotiation of the aforementioned contract, Hungary's position in the negotiations will not be any more favourable.

The improvement of the present situation is what Hungary should focus on, not on signing a contract that will bind the country for another thirty years. Moreover, the EU's guidelines on competition oppose such long-term supply contracts and set the maximum duration at ten years, precisely in order to prevent some countries from being put at the mercy of others. Therefore, to encourage a contract with a longer duration is "interesting".

Finally, the u-turn in US foreign policy is not what it appears to be. By and large, Washington's stance in regard to Nabucco and South Stream has remained unchanged over the past eighty years. The only difference is that the Obama administration has emphasized that as alternative gas transportation is a key issue for us, so we should build these routes. This view can be criticized, and more active support asked for, but to conclude from all this that Washington is just happy with South Stream is...well ... more than interesting.